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Abstract
We present an approximately-efﬁcient and approximately-strategyproof auction mecha-
nismforasingle-good multi-unit allocation problem. Thebidding language allowsmarginal-
decreasing piecewise constant curves and quantity-based side constraints. We develop a
fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for the multi-unit allocation problem, which
computes a
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a constant number of pieces. We integrate this approximation scheme within a Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanism and compute payments for an asymptotic cost of
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The maximal possible gain from manipulation to a bidder in the combined scheme is
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" is the total surplus in the efﬁcient outcome.
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Electronic markets facilitate new methods for procurement through expressive bid-
ding and automated winner-determination. Electronic markets have been used to
sell wireless spectrum [6], to procure school meals by the Chilean government
[8], for course-registration at Chicago GSB [13], and for the procurement of lo-
gistics services [22]. Both economic and computational considerations are central
to the design of useful electronic markets. Economic desiderata for markets can
include allocative-efﬁciency and revenue-optimality [19]. Computational desider-
ata for markets can include tractable bidding strategies [26], minimal preference
elicitation [27], and tractable winner determination [29].
Supporting simple truth-revealing bidding strategies in a dominant-strategy equi-
librium has received attention in the literature [33,26]. This property is called strat-
egyproofness. A strategyproof auction is useful because it simpliﬁes the bidding
problem: the optimal bidding strategy is known to bidders and does not require
that a bidder models the preferences or strategies of other participants. What often
emergesisaninterestingtradeoffbetweenprovidingtractablewinner-determination
algorithms and supporting strategyproofness. Well known economic mechanisms
that provide strategyproofness can require that the marke-tmaker solves intractable
winner-determination problems, and truth-revelation can quickly unravel when ap-
proximations are introduced [25]. Our results are positive:we present auction mod-
els that are tractable and for which truthful bidding is almost the dominant strategy
for a bidder.
We consider a multi-unit allocation problem, that models both the problem of a
seller with multiple identical units of a good and the problem of a buyer that seeks
to procure multiple identical units of a good. The problem is motivated by recent
trends in electronic commerce; for instance, corporations are increasingly using
auctions for their strategic sourcing of commodity goods [15]. We provide a com-
pact and expressive bidding language that allows marginal-decreasing piecewise
constant price-schedules together with quantity-based side constraints. Our main
contribution is to present a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme, that is
both approximately efﬁcient and approximately strategyproof.
In the procurement setting we consider a buyer with value
(
)
+
* for
, units
of a good, and
- suppliers each with a marginal-decreasing piecewise-constant
cost function. The bidding language also allows each supplier to express an up-
per bound (or capacity constraint) on the number of units she can supply. This
allows a supplier to express an inﬁnite ask price for supplying large numbers of
units that are beyond her capacity and is an important consideration in practical
settings. As a concrete example, the procurement auction models the procurement
of circuit boards in ﬂexible sized lots from multiple suppliers each of which can
state a capacity constraint.
2In the forward auction setting we consider a seller with
, units of a good, and
- buyers each with a marginal-decreasing piecewise-constant valuation function.
Here, the language also allows a buyer to express a lower bound (or minimum
lot size) on the number of units that she will buy. This allows a buyer to submit
a bid price of zero for initial units, and is an important consideration in practical
settings. As a concrete example, our forward auction models a setting in which a
PC manufacturer would like to sell excess inventory in ﬂexible-size lots and each
buyer has a minimal number of units that she must procure.
We consider the computational complexity of implementing the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) [32,5,14] mechanism for this multi-unit allocation problem. The
VCG mechanism is strategyproof for suppliers in the procurement auction and
strategyproof for buyers in the forward auction, and supports allocative-efﬁciency
such that purchasing (selling) decisions are made to maximize the total economic
surplus in the economy. There is an asymmetry between the procurement and the
forward auction directions because we model the buyer in the procurement setting
with a ﬁnite value for the goods, while the seller in the forward auction is assumed
to have no intrinsic value for the goods on sale. This asymmetry limits the appli-
cation of our procurement auction to those in which the total payments collected
by suppliers are less than the buyer’s value. No such restriction is required in the
forward auction direction.
The winner-determination problem in the multiunit allocation problem is (weakly)
intractable,andhastheclassic0/1knapsackproblemasaspecialcase.Thequantity-
based side constraints preclude the adoption of a simple greedy allocation scheme.
The winner-determination problem is a novel and interesting generalization of the
classicknapsackproblem.Weprovideafullypolynomial-timeapproximationscheme,
computing a
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bid has a ﬁxed number of piecewise constant pieces.
We demonstrate that the approximate VCG mechanism, in which this
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( from a non-truthful bid, where
( is the total surplus from the efﬁcient allocation. As such, this is an example of
a computationally-tractable
? -dominance result.
￿ In practice, we can have good
conﬁdence that bidders without good information about the bidding strategies of
other participants will have little to gain from attempts at manipulation. Formally,
we can justify truthful bidding in equilibrium by modeling bidders as indifferent to
payments that are within
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( of each other.
￿ However, this may not be an example of what Feigenbaum & Shenker [10] refer to as a
tolerably-manipulable mechanism because we have not tried to bound the effect of such a
manipulation on the efﬁciency of the outcome. VCG mechanism do have a natural “self-
correcting” property, though, because a useful manipulation to an agent is a reported value
that improves the total value of the allocation based on the reports of other agents and the
agent’s own value.
3The main innovation in this paper is to provide a fast method to integrate the ap-
proximation algorithm for winner-determination into the calculation of VCG pay-
ments. A straightforward scheme would require an asymptotic time
:
I
.
=
-
J
7
K
5 to com-
pute payments to all
- bidders. Our scheme determines approximate VCG pay-
ments in worst-case time
:
I
.
=
L
M
7
H
N
￿
O
$
P
Q
.
F
L
 
-
>
@
?
5
G
5 , where
L is a constant that quantiﬁes
a reasonable “no-monopoly” assumption. Speciﬁcally, in the reverse auction, sup-
pose that
R
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, units with all suppliers
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5 is the minimal cost without supplier
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5 , over all suppliers
W . This upper-bound
tends to 1 as the number of suppliers increases.
Section 2 formally deﬁnes the forward and reverse auctions, and deﬁnes the VCG
mechanisms. We also prove our claims about
? -strategyproofness. Section 3 pro-
vides the generalized knapsack formulation for the multi-unit allocation problems
and introduces the fully polynomial time approximation scheme. Section 4 deﬁnes
the approximation scheme for the payments in the VCG mechanism. Section 5
concludes.
1.1 Related Work
There has been considerable interest in recent years in characterizing polynomial-
time or approximable special cases of the general combinatorial allocation prob-
lem, in which there are multiple different items. The combinatorial allocation prob-
lem (CAP) is both NP-complete [29] and inapproximable ([30]). Although some
polynomial-time cases have been identiﬁed for the CAP (e.g. [7]), introducing an
expressive exclusive-or bidding language quickly breaks these special cases. In this
work we identify a non-trivial but approximable allocation problem with an ex-
pressive exclusive-or bidding language—the bid taker in our setting is allowed to
accept at most one point on the bid curve.
The idea of using approximations within the allocation rules of mechanisms, while
retaining either full-strategyproofness or
? -dominance has received some previous
attention. For instance, Lehmann et al. [23] propose a greedy and strategyproof
approximation to a single-minded combinatorial auction problem. Nisan & Ro-
nen [25] discussed approximate VCG-based mechanisms, but either appealed to
particular maximal-in-range approximations to retain full strategyproofness, or to
resource-bounded agents with information or computationallimitationson the abil-
ity to compute strategies.
Feigenbaum & Shenker [10] have deﬁned the concept of strategically faithful ap-
proximations, and proposed the study of approximations as an important direction
for algorithmic mechanism design. Schummer [31] and Parkes et al. [28] have pre-
viously considered
? -dominance, in the context of economic impossibility results,
4for example in combinatorial exchanges. Archer et al. [1] adopt similar notions of
approximate-strategyproofness in their work on single-minded combinatorial auc-
tions.
A recent characterization due to Lavi et al. [21] suggests that it is in fact neces-
sary to relax full strategyproofness and consider approximate-strategyproofness in
our multi-unit problem: their analysis suggests that no worst-case polynomial time
algorithm can be strategyproof and have good approximation properties for the
multi-unit allocation problem.
Eso et al. [9] have studied a similar procurement problem, but for a different
volume discount model. This earlier work formulates the problem as a general
mixed integer linear program, and gives some empirical results on simulated data.
Kalagnanam et al. [18] address double auctions, where multiple buyers and sellers
submit demand and supply curves for a divisible good, and investigate competitive-
equilibrium outcomes for myopically-rational agents.
Ausubel [2] has proposed an ascending-price multi-unit auction for buyers with
marginal-decreasing values and no lower-bounds on lot size, with an interpretation
as a primal-dual algorithm [3]. Iwasaki et al. [17] generalize Ausubel’s methods to
allow general valuations in this multi-unit auction problem, and thus their auction
applies to the models in the current paper. However, the primary focus in Iwasaki et
al. is on providing robustness to false-name bids [34] in which bidders participate
under multiple identities. Their auction runs in pseudo-polynomial time, but does
not provide any worst-case approximation guarantees.
2 Approximately-Strategyproof VCG Auctions
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the marginal-decreasing piecewise bidding lan-
guage that is used in our forward and reverse (procurement) auctions. Continuing,
we introduce the VCG mechanism for the problem and the
? -dominance results
for approximations to VCG outcomes. We also discuss the economic properties of
VCG mechanisms in these forward and reverse auction multi-unit settings.
2.1 Marginal-Decreasing Piecewise Bids
We provide a piecewise-constant and marginal-decreasing bidding language. This
bidding language is expressive for a natural class of valuation and cost functions:
ﬁxed unit prices over intervals of quantities. See Figure 1 for an example. We re-
lax the marginal-decreasing requirement to allow a bidder in the forward auction
to state a minimal purchase amount, to reﬂect a zero value for quantities smaller
5than that amount. Similarly, a supplier in the reverse auction can state a capacity
constraint to reﬂect an (effectively) inﬁnite cost to supply quantities in excess of a
particular amount.
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Fig. 1. Marginal-decreasing, piecewise constant bids. In the forward auction bid, the bidder
offers $10 per unit for quantity in the range
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In detail, in a forward auction, a bid from buyer
W can be written as a list of
(quantity-range, unit-price) tuples,
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in the (semi-open) quantity range
u
^
i
w
v
j
k
i
x
v
E
!
&
j
5 is
l
v
j for each unit. Additionally, it is
assumed that the valuation is 0 for quantities less than
i
&
j as well as for quantities
more than
i
p
j . This is implemented by adding two dummy bid tuples, with zero
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A supplier’s bid is similarly deﬁned in the reverse auction. The interpretation is
that the bidder’s cost in the (semi-open) quantity range
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l . This is a standard assumption in the auction literature,
and equivalent to assuming risk-neutral agents [19]. We will use the term payoff
interchangeably for utility.
62.2 VCG-Based Multi-Unit Auctions
Weconstructthetractableandapproximately-strategyproofmulti-unitauctionsaround
a standard VCG mechanism.In the forward auction,we modela sellerwith
, units
and no intrinsic value for the items. Given a set of bids from
S agents, let
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denote the maximal value to the seller without bids from agent
W . The VCG mech-
anism for this problem has the following steps:
(1) Collect piecewise-constant bid curves and capacity constraints from all the
buyers.
(2) Implement the outcome,
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(3) Collect payment
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pass the payments to the seller.
In this forward auction, the VCG mechanism is strategyproof for buyers, which
means that truthful bidding is a dominant strategy and utility maximizing whatever
the bids of other buyers. In addition, the VCG mechanism is allocatively-efﬁcient,
and the total payments maximize the revenue to the seller in expectation across
all efﬁcient auctions, even allowing for Bayesian-Nash implementations [20]. Each
buyer pays less than its value, and receives payoff
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This is precisely the marginal-value that buyer
W contributes to the economy.
In the reverse (or procurement) auction we model a buyer with value
(
)
£
* to
purchase at least
, units and no value otherwise and
- suppliers. Each supplier
has a marginal-decreasing cost function, subject to a capacity constraint. To sim-
plify the mechanism design problem we assume a straightforward buyer that will
truthfully announce this value to the mechanism.
⁄ The VCG mechanism remains
strategyproof for suppliers without this assumption, but the efﬁciency of the out-
come can be compromised.
Thewinner-determinationproblemistodeterminetheallocation,
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⁄ Without this assumption, the Myerson-Satterthwaite [24] impossibility result would al-
ready imply that we should not expect an efﬁcient trading mechanism in this setting.
7total payment is collected from the buyer. The payoff to each supplier is equal to
the marginal value contributed to the system, and precisely
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The total payments to suppliers in the reverse VCG auction can be greater than the
buyer’s value for the goods. This is not a problem with the VCG auction per se but
rather a problem with the efﬁcient multi-unit allocation problem in this reverse di-
rection. The single-item, one buyer and one seller, bargaining problem is a special
case of this problem, and a setting in which the well known Myerson-Satterthwaite
[24] impossibilityresult holds.It is notpossibleto constructan efﬁcient mechanism
for the bargaining problem, that satisﬁes participation (i.e. with the buyer paying
less than her value), without sometimes running at a deﬁcit. In fact, the VCG mech-
anismmaximizesthe expectedrevenueto thebuyer across allefﬁcient auctions[20]
and there can be no efﬁcient auction in which the buyer always pays less than her
value when the VCG mechanism fails to satisfy this property.
Formally, the total payment collected by suppliers in the VCG mechanism in equi-
librium is less than the buyer’s value for the items if and only if the following
condition holds:
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This states that the total payoff to the suppliers is no greater than the total payoff
from the efﬁcient allocation. In particular, we need that there are no “pivotal” sup-
pliers for which there is no efﬁcient trade without the supplier (i.e.
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ported surplus, which is the outcome that she could achieve in some equilibrium of
the underyling bargaining problem. In the absence of pivotal suppliers, condition
(1) simpliﬁes to:
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This condition states that marginal value contributed by each supplier to the econ-
omy, summed across all suppliers, must be less than the marginal value provided
by the suppliers when they act as a single coalition.
· In this case the buyer’s pay-
ment will be no greater than her value for the outcome and the efﬁcient trade can
be implemented.
Consider an example with 3 agents
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· This condition is implied by agents are substitutes [4], which is necessary and sufﬁcient
to support VCG payments in the core in a combinatorial allocation problem.
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than her value. Pragmatically, the buyer needs an opt-out to cancel the auction in
this second case and avoid purchasing the items at a loss. However, this would
affect strategyproofness on the sell-side. For instance, if the auction was never to
be repeated than seller 3 would prefer to understate her cost for supplying goods in
combinationwith seller 1 so that
R
<
.
0
/
￿
5
„
8
”
…
‘
* . The effect would be to adjustpayoffs
to
￿
8
;
.
0
/
￿
*
k
6
￿
*
k
6
￿
*
k
~
￿
*
`
5 (with supplier 2 receiving a smaller payment).
Thus the consequence of this asymmetry between the reverse and forward auctions
is that the reverse (procurement) auction is only applicable in settings in which
supplier costs and the buyer’s value is such that condition (2) is sure to hold.
2.3
? -Strategyproofness
Wenowconsiderthestrategicconsequencesofintroducinganapproximationschemes
into the VCG mechanism. It is well known that any approximation that does not
remain optimal on some ﬁxed range of outcomes must lead to a failure of full strat-
egyproofness [25]. However, we derive a simple
? -strategyproofness result, that
bounds the maximal gain in payoff that an agent can expect to achieve through a
unilateral deviation from following a simple truth-revealing strategy. We describe
the result for the forward auction problem, but it is quite a general observation.
Let
￿
(
<
.
￿
S
[
5 and
￿
(
<
.
￿
S
<
U
 
W
￿
5 denote the value of the allocation computed with an approx-
imation scheme, and assume that the approximation satisﬁes:
.
e
/
ˆ
1
˜
3
6
5
￿
￿
(
I
.
￿
S
[
5
2
¥
ﬂ
(
<
.
￿
S
[
5
for some
3
￿
)
”
* . We provide such an approximation scheme for our setting later in
the paper. Let
￿
￿ denote the allocation implemented by the approximation scheme,
and consider the VCG mechanism with this approximation. The payoff to agent
W ,
for announcing valuation
￿
￿
j , is:
￿
j
.
￿
￿
j
5
￿
1
￿
ﬁ
v
￿
¯
˘
j
￿
￿
v
.
￿
￿
v
5
￿
￿
(
<
.
￿
S
›
U
‹
W
￿
5 (3)
The ﬁnal term is independent of the agent’s announced value, and can be ignored
in an incentive analysis. However, agent
W can try to improve its payoff through the
effect of its announced value on the allocation
￿
￿ implemented by the mechanism.
In particular, agent
W wants the mechanism to select
￿
￿ to maximize the sum of
its true value,
￿
j
.
￿
￿
j
5 , and the reported value of the other agents,
˙
v
￿
¯
˘
j
￿
￿
v
.
￿
￿
v
5 . If
the mechanism’s allocation algorithm is optimal, then all the agent needs to do is
truthfully state its value and the mechanism will do the rest. However, faced with
9an approximate allocation algorithm and the reports of other agents, the agent can
try to improve its payoff by announcing a value that corrects for the approximation.
Let
(
<
.
n
￿
j
k
￿
￿
s
j
5 denote the total value of the efﬁcient allocation given the reported
values
￿
￿
s
j of agents
￿
￿
¨
8
￿
W , and given the true value of agent
W . We say a mechanism
is
3 -strategyproof if an agent can gain at most
3 through some non-truthful strategy.
Theorem 1 A VCG-based mechanism with a
.
0
/
￿
1
?
5 -allocation scheme is
.
H
˚
&
F
E
˚
5
￿
(
<
.
n
￿
j
k
￿
￿
s
j
5 -strategyproof for agent
W given bids
￿
￿
s
j from other agents.
PROOF. Recall from Eq. (3) that the agent’s payoff, given outcome
￿
￿ , is
￿
j
.
￿
￿
j
5
￿
1
˙
v
￿
¯
˘
j
￿
￿
v
.
￿
￿
v
5
￿
￿
(
￿
.
￿
S
”
U
¸
W
￿
5 . Thus the maximal beneﬁt to agent
W from reporting a
non-truthful
￿
￿
j
¨
8
￿
j occurs when the initial approximation is as bad as possi-
ble given the approximation bounds. This occurs when the value from solution
￿
￿ is
(
I
.
n
￿
j
k
￿
￿
s
j
5
>
.
0
/
￿
1
?
5 . In this case, agent
W can hope to report
￿
￿
j that will cause
the winner-determination algorithm to select outcome
￿
† that maximizes
￿
j
.
n
￿
†
j
5
￿
1
˙
v
￿
¯
˘
j
￿
￿
v
.
˝
￿
†
v
5 and achieves total value
(
I
.
=
￿
j
k
￿
￿
s
j
5 . The agent’s gain in utility in this
case, in comparison with truthful bidding, is
(
I
.
=
￿
j
k
￿
￿
s
j
5
￿
(
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.
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￿
j
k
￿
￿
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j
5
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5
˛
Formally, we interpret approximate strategyproofness as a statement that truth-
revelationisa dominantstrategyequilibriumfor an agentthatisindifferentbetween
payments that are within
.
F
3
>
/
J
1
H
3
~
5
G
(
q
ˇ
￿
m
— where
(
Q
ˇ
￿
m
— is the maximal value from trade
across all possible economies.
Note that although we do not need to bound the accuracy of the estimated optimal
value without agent
W to demonstrate approximate strategyproofness, this bound is
required to provide a good approximation to the revenue properties of the VCG
mechanism.
3 The Generalized Knapsack Problem
In thissection, we designa fully polynomialapproximationscheme for the general-
ized knapsack, which models the winner-determination in the multi-unit allocation
problem. We describe our results for the reverse auction variation, but the formula-
tion is completely symmetric for the forward-auction.
In describing our approximation scheme, we begin with a simple property (the An-
chor property) of an optimal knapsack solution. We use this property to reduce
10our problem to a simpler but restricted problem. We present a 2-approxmation for
the restricted problem and then use this basic approximation to develop a fully
polynomial-time approximation scehme for this restricted problem (FPTAS). Lat-
ter we use the FPTAS for the restricted problem to develop an FPTAS for the gen-
eralized knapsack problem.
One of the major appeals of our piecewise bidding language is its compact repre-
sentation of the bidder’s valuation functions. We strive to preserve this, and present
an approximation scheme that will depend only on the number of bidders, and not
the maximum quantity,
, , demanded by the buyer, which can be very large in
realistic procurement settings.
The FPTAS implements an
.
e
/
K
1
?
5 approximation to the optimal solution
￿
￿
￿ , in
worst-case time
7
￿
8
￿
:
<
.
=
-
￿
>
@
?
5 , where
- is the number of bidders, and where we
assume that the piecewise bid for each bidder has
:
I
.
0
/
￿
5 pieces. The dependence on
the number of pieces is also polynomial: if each bid has a maximum of
￿ pieces,
then the running time can be derived by substituting
-
￿ for each occurrence of
- .
3.1 Preliminaries
Before we begin, let us recall the classic 0/1 knapsack problem: we are given a set
of
- items, where the item
W has value
￿
j and size
￿
j , and a knapsack of capacity
, ; all sizes are integers. The goal is to determine a subset of items of maximum
value with total size at most
, . Since we want to focus on a reverse auction, the
equivalent knapsack problem will be to choose a set of items with minimum value
(i.e. cost) whose size exceeds
, . The generalized knapsack problem of interest to
us can be deﬁned as follows:
Generalized Knapsack:
Instance: A target
, , and a set of
- lists, where the
W th list has the form
￿
j
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￿
~
.
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5
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.
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.
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W
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5
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5
￿
￿
k
where
i
￿
v
j are increasing with
￿ and
l
v
j are decreasing with
￿ , and
i
x
v
j
k
F
l
v
j
k
, are
positive integers.
Problem: Determine a set of integers
￿
w
v
j such that
(1) (One per list) At most one
￿
v
j is non-zero for any
W ,
(2) (Membership)
￿
v
j
¨
8
”
* implies
￿
v
j
2
￿
u
^
i
v
j
k
i
v
E
!
&
j
5 ,
(3) (Target)
˙
j
˙
v
￿
￿
v
j
¥
￿
, , and
(4) (Objective)
˙
j
˙
v
l
v
j
￿
￿
v
j is minimized.
This generalized knapsack formulation is a clear generalization of the classic 0/1
knapsack. In the latter, each list consists of a single point
.
m
￿
j
k
￿
j
5 .
11The connectionbetweenthe generalizedknapsack andour auctionproblemistrans-
parent. Each list encodes a bid, representing multiple mutually exclusive quantity
intervals, and one can choose any quantity in an interval, but at most one interval
can be selected. Choosing interval
u
￿
i
w
v
j
k
i
￿
v
E
!
&
j
5 has cost
l
v
j per unit. The goal is to
procure at least
, units of the good at minimum possible cost. The generalized
knapsack problem has some ﬂavor of the continuous knapsack problem. However,
there are two major differences that make our problem signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult:
(1) intervals have boundaries, and so to choose interval
u
^
i
Q
v
j
k
i
￿
v
E
!
&
j
5 requires that at
least
i
v
j and at most
i
v
E
!
&
j units must be taken; (2) unlike the classic knapsack, we
cannot sort the items (bids) by value
> size, since different intervals in one list have
different unit costs.
In fact, because of the “one per list” constraint, the generalized problem is closer
in spirit to the multiple choice knapsack problem [11], where the underling set of
items is partitioned into disjoint subsets
￿
&
k
￿
’
k
￿
o
￿
o
￿
o
￿
k
￿
 
￿ , and one can choose at most
one item fromeach subset.PTAS do existfor the multiplechoice knapsack problem
[12], and indeed, one can convert our problem into a huge instance of this problem,
by creating one group for each list; put a (quantity, price) point tuple
.
˝
￿
k
m
l
5 for each
possible quantity for a bidder into his group (subset). However, this conversion
explodes the problem size, making it infeasible for all but the most trivial instances.
3.2 Anchor Property
We begin with a deﬁnition. Given an instance of the generalized knapsack, we
call each tuple
￿
v
j
8
.
=
i
v
j
k
m
l
v
j
5 an anchor. Recall that these tuples represent the
breakpoints in the piecewise constant curve bids. We say that the size of an anchor
￿
v
j is
i
v
j , the minimum number of units available at this anchor’s price
l
v
j . The cost
of the anchor
￿
F
v
j is deﬁned to be the minimum total price associated with this tuple,
namely,
￿
6
￿
￿
￿
￿
Æ
g
.
n
￿
v
j
5
H
8
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j
i
v
j if
￿
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j , and
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￿
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In a feasible solution
￿
￿
&
k
￿
’
k
￿
o
￿
o
￿
o
￿
k
￿
Q
￿
￿
– of the generalized knapsack, we say that
an element
￿
j
¨
8
ª
* is an anchor if
￿
j
8
￿
i
￿
v
j , for some anchor
i
w
v
j . Otherwise, we
say that
￿
j is midrange. We observe that an optimal knapsack solution can always
be constructed so that at most one solution element is midrange. If there are two
midrange elements
￿ and
￿
q
† , for bids from two different agents, with
￿
￿
￿
J
† , then
we can increment
￿
† and decrement
￿ , until one of them becomes an anchor. See
Figure 2 for an example.
Lemma 1 [Anchor Property] There exists an optimal solution of the generalized
knapsack problem with at most one midrange element. All other elements are an-
chors.
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(i) Optimal solution with
     2 midrange bids
(ii) Optimal soltution with
Fig. 2. (i) An optimal solution with more than one bid not anchored (2,3); (ii) an optimal
solution with only one bid (3) not anchored.
3.3 Algorithm Roadmap
First we consider a restricted generalized knapsack problem, where we assume that
the midrange element corresponding to the optimal solution is known. By anchor
property, we know that any other element,
￿
j , is going to be one of the anchor point
in the list
W of the generalized knapsack problem. Therefore, the restricted problem
is very similar to the multiple choice knapsack problem. We use the approxima-
tion scheme for multiple choice knapsack problem to develop an approximation
scheme for the restricted problem. The approximation scheme for the restricted
problem, in turn, is used to develop an approximation scheme for the generalized
knapsack problem. This is done by iterating over all the choices for midrange ele-
ment, solving the corresponding restricted problem and choosing the solution with
the minimum cost as the ﬁnal solution. Following pseudo-code presents the high
level idea. In the pseudo code, the tuple
.
t
￿
k
￿
￿
5 represents a midrange element, where
￿
w
￿ lies in
u
^
i
v
￿
k
i
v
E
!
&
￿
5 .
￿ for
￿ = 1 to n do
￿ for
￿ in list
￿ of generalized knapsack do
￿ Solve the problem assuming
.
˝
￿
k
￿
￿
5 as midrange element. Let
Ł
A
.
˝
￿
k
￿
￿
5 be the
solution.
￿ Return
§
¸
Ø
￿
Œ
q
º
￿
￿
v
G
￿
￿
Ł
￿
.
˝
￿
k
￿
￿
5
a
– .
3.4 2-approximation
Let us assume that the midrange element corresponding to the optimal solution is
known. Suppose that, in the optimal solution,
￿
q
￿ is midrange element and agent
￿ lies in its
￿ th range,
u
￿
i
x
v
￿
k
i
￿
v
E
!
&
￿
5 . Now we can reduce the generalized knapsack
problem to a simpler problem where
￿
Q
￿ has to lie between
u
^
i
v
￿
k
i
v
E
!
&
￿
5 and any other
￿
j has to be either zero or one of the anchor points in list
W . The objective of the new
problem is same as the original problem, that is, to obtain
, units at the minimum
cost. It is worth noting that an optimal solution for this restricted problem is also
13going to be an optimal solution for the generalized knapsack problem.
The new problem contains
- groups. There are
-
￿
/ groups of potential anchors,
where
W th group contains all the anchors of the list
W in the generalized knapsack.
The group for agent
￿ contains two elements. The ﬁrst element,
￿
&
￿ , is the anchor
point
.
=
i
v
￿
k
F
l
v
￿
5 . The second element,
￿
’
￿ , represents the interval
u
y
*
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i
v
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￿
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i
v
￿
5 , and
the associated unit-price
l
v
￿ . Since
￿
|
￿ lies between
i
v
￿ and
i
v
E
!
&
￿ , any solution should
choose
￿
&
￿ to ensure that
￿
|
￿ is at least
i
x
v
￿ . The second element,
￿
’
￿ , represents the
excess number of units that can be taken from agent
￿ in addition to
i
v
￿ , which has
already been committed. In any other group, we can choose at most one anchor.
The following pseudo-code describes our algorithm for this restricted generalized
knapsack problem.
￿ is the union of all the tuples in
- groups, including tuple
￿
’
￿
for agent
￿ . The size of this special tuple is deﬁned as
i
|
v
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￿ , and the cost is
deﬁned as
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￿
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.
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￿
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￿
5 .
￿ is the number of units that remain to be acquired.
￿ is
the set of tuples accepted in the current tentativesolution.Since any solutionshould
contain
￿
&
￿ , we add it to
￿ and initialize
￿ to be
,
￿
i
w
v
￿ .
￿
￿
æ
6
￿
￿
Æ is the best solution
found so far. Variable
￿
￿
￿
x
W
l is only used in the proof of correctness.
Algorithm Greedy
(1) Sort all tuples of
￿ in the ascending order of unit price; in case of ties, sort in
ascending order of unit quantities.
(2) Set
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(3) Scan the tuples in
￿ in the sorted order. Suppose the next tuple is
￿
￿
j , i.e. the
￿ th anchor from agent
W .
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otherwise do the following steps:
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The approximation algorithm is very similar to the approximation algorithm for
knapsack [16]. Since we wish to minimize the total cost, we consider the tuples in
order of increasing per unit cost. If the size of tuple
￿
￿
j is smaller than
￿ , then we
add it to
￿ , update
￿ , and delete from
￿ all the tuples that belong to the same group
as
￿
￿
j . If
￿
￿
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5 is greater than
￿ , then
￿ along with
￿
￿
j forms a feasible solution.
However, this solution can be far from optimal if the size of
￿
￿
j is much larger than
14￿ . If total cost of
￿ and
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j is smaller than the current best solution,we update
￿
￿
æ
6
￿
￿
Æ .
One exception to this rule is the tuple
￿
’
￿ . Since this tuple can be taken fractionally,
we update
￿
￿
æ
6
￿
￿
Æ if the sum of
￿ ’s cost and fractional cost of
￿
’
￿ is an improvement.
The algorithm terminates in either of the ﬁrst two cases, or when all tuples are
scanned. In particular, it terminates whenever we ﬁnd a
￿
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j such that
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it gives a feasible solution.
Lemma 2 Suppose
Ł
￿ is an optimal solution of the generalized knapsack with
element
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5 being midrange. Then, the solution
Ł , returned by Greedy is a 2-
approximation to
Ł
￿
￿ .
PROOF. Let
Ł be the value returned by Greedy. Consider the set
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In the second case, imagine a modiﬁed instance of the problem, which excludes
all the tuples of the set
￿
￿
￿
x
W
l . Since none of these tuples were included in
Ł
“
￿ , the
optimal solution for the modiﬁed problem should be same as one for the origi-
nal. Suppose our approximation algorithm returns the value
Ł
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† for this modiﬁed
instance.
Let
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† be the last tuple considered by the approximation algorithm before termina-
tion of the modiﬁed instance, and let
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￿ be the corresponding tentative solution set
in that step. Running the greedy algorithm for the modiﬁed instance can be thought
as running it for the original problem except instead of adding a tuple to
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ignore it. Therefore, even for the original problem,
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Also, for the modiﬁed instance, as we consider tuples in order of increasing per
unit price, and none of the tuples are going to be placed in the set
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This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
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Sofar, wehaveconsideredtherestrictedproblemwhereweassumethatthemidrange
element corresponding to the optimal solution is known. We convert the 2 approx-
imation algorithm for the restricted problem to one for generalized knapsack prob-
lem by using the idea presented in the section 3.3. We run the algorithm Greedy
once for each tuple
.
˝
￿
k
￿
￿
5 as a candidate for midrange element and choose the solu-
tion with the minimum cost as our ﬁnal solution.
There are
:
<
.
=
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￿
5 tuples and we execute the algorithm Greedy for each of them. It is
easy to see that, after an initial sorting of the tuples, the algorithm takes
:
<
.
=
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￿
5 time.
Alsothesortingneeds tobe doneonlyonce andhence the totalcostof thealgorithm
is
:
I
.
=
-
’
5 . Thus, we have our ﬁrst polynomial time approximation algorithm.
Theorem 2 A 2-approximation of the generalized knapsack problem can be found
in time
:
<
.
=
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’
5 , where
- is number of item lists (each of constant length).
The dependence on the number of pieces is also polynomial: if each bid has a
maximum of
￿ pieces, then the running time is
:
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.
n
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3.5 An Approximation Scheme
We now use the 2-approximation algorithm presented in the preceding section to
develop a fully polynomial approximation (FPTAS) for the generalized knapsack
problem.The highlevelidea isfairly standard,butthe detailsrequire technical care.
Similar to the 2-approximation algorithm, we ﬁrst consider the restricted problem
where the midrange element is known.
Let the midrange element be
￿
Q
￿ , which falls in the range
u
^
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5 . Our FPTAS
runs in two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, we solve a multiple choice knapsack prob-
16lem, mKnapsack, where we construct a dynamic programmingtable to compute the
minimumcost at which at least
,
￿
i
x
v
E
!
&
￿ units can be obtained using the remaining
-
￿
/ lists in the generalized knapsack. In the second phase, we go through the last
row of the dynamic programming table, searching for the entry, which along with
the midrange element minimizes the cost of obtaining at least M units.
Suppose
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￿
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￿
W
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￿
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¢ denotes the maximum number of units that can be obtained at
cost at most
￿ using only the ﬁrst
W lists (ignoring the
￿ th list) in the generalized
knapsack. Then, the following recurrence relation describes how to construct the
dynamic programming table:
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– , is the set of anchors for agent
W .
As convention, agent
W will index the row, and cost
￿ will index the column.
This dynamic programming algorithm is only pseudo-polynomial, since the num-
ber of columnin the dynamicprogrammingtable depends upon the total cost.How-
ever, we can convert it into a FPTAS by scaling the cost dimension.
Let
Ł denote the 2-approximation to the generalized knapsack problem, with to-
tal cost,
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This scaling improves the running time of the algorithm because the number of
columns in the modiﬁed table is at most
 
￿
C
!
, and independent of the total cost.
However, the computed solution might not be an optimal solution for the original
problem. We show that the error introduced is within a factor of
? of the optimal
solution.
As a prelude to our approximation guarantee, we ﬁrst show that if two different
solutions to the mKnapsack problem have equal scaled cost, then their original
(unscaled) costs cannot differ by more than
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Lemma 3 Let
￿ and
# be two distinct feasible solutions of mKnapsack. If
￿ and
# have equal scaled costs, then their unscaled costs cannot differ by more than
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However, by (4), the scaled costs satisfy the following inequalities:
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Substituting the upper-bound on scaled cost from (6) for
￿
6
￿
￿
￿
￿
Æ
￿
.
˝
￿
!
5 , the lower-bound
on scaled cost from (6) for
￿
6
￿
￿
￿
￿
Æ
g
.
)
#
w
5 , and using equality (5) to simplify, we have:
￿
6
￿
￿
￿
￿
Æ
￿
.
˝
￿
!
5
￿
￿
6
￿
￿
￿
￿
Æ
￿
.
*
#
|
5
￿
?
￿
6
￿
￿
￿
￿
Æ
g
.
n
Ł
￿
5
-
ﬁ
j
¯
˘
￿
ﬁ
￿
$
+
&
‘
u
￿
W
k
￿
￿
¢
￿
?
￿
6
￿
￿
￿
￿
Æ
￿
.
=
Ł
￿
5
k
The last inequality uses the fact that at most
- components of an indicator vector
are non-zero; that is, any feasible solution contains at most
- tuples.
˛
Finally, given the dynamic programming table for mKnapsack, we consider all the
entries in the last row of this table,
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¢ . These entries correspond to optimal
solutions with all agents except
￿ , for different levels of cost. In particular, we con-
sider the entries that provide at least
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￿ units. Together with a contribution
from agent
￿ , we choose the entry in this set that minimizes the total cost, deﬁned
as follows:
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The following lemma shows that we achieve a
.
e
/
ˆ
1
?
5 -approximation.
Lemma 4 Suppose
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18scaled costassociatedwiththe vector
￿
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table constructed for mKnapack, and consider its entry
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The presented scheme assumes that the midrange element is known. Using the
ideas presented in section 3.3, we convert the approximation scheme for restricted
problem to one for the generalized knapsack problem. The approximation scheme
for generalized knapsack problem solves
:
<
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=
-
￿
5 restricted problems, corresponding
to
:
I
.
n
-
￿
5 choices of midrange element, and chooses one with the minimum cost as
the ﬁnal solution.
For a given midrange, the most expensive step in the algorithm is the construc-
tion of dynamic programming table, which can be done in
:
I
.
=
-
’
>
￿
?
5 time assuming
constant intervals per list. Thus, we have the following result.
Theorem 3 We can compute an
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5 approximation to the solution of a gener-
alized knapsack problem in worst-case time
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The dependence on the number of pieces is also polynomial: if each bid has a
maximum of
￿ pieces, then the running time can be derived by substituting
￿
- for
19each occurrence of
- .
4 Computing VCG Payments
A naive approach to computing the VCG payments requires solving the alloca-
tion problem
- times, removing each agent in turn. We extend our approximation
scheme for the generalized knapsack, and determine all
- payments in total time
:
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L , for a constant upper bound,
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and
7 is the complexity of solving the allocation problem once. This
L -bound can
be justiﬁed as a “no monopoly” condition, because it bounds the marginal value
that a single buyer brings to the auction. Similarly, in the reverse variation we can
compute the VCG payments to each supplier in time
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Our overall strategy will be to build two dynamic programming tables, one forward
and one backward, for each midrange element
.
￿
k
￿
￿
5 , and use these tables to solve
all subproblems without each agent. The forward table is built by considering the
agents in the order of their indices, where as the backward table is built by con-
sidering them in the reverse order. The optimal solution corresponding to
R
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Y
5
can be broken into two parts: one corresponding to the ﬁrst (
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/ ) agents and the
other corresponding to the last (
-
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W ) agents. As the (
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/ )th row of the forward
table corresponds to the suppliers with the ﬁrst (
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/ ) indices, an approximation to
the ﬁrst part will be contained in (
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/ )th row of the forward table. Similarly, the
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5 th row of the backward table will contain an approximation for the second
part. We ﬁrst present a simple but inefﬁcient way of computing the approximate
value of
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.
￿
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￿
U
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Y
5 , which serves to illustrate the main idea of our algorithm. Then
we present an improved scheme, which uses the fact that the elements in the rows
are sorted, to compute the approximate value more efﬁciently.
Inthefollowing,we concentrateoncomputinganallocationinwhich
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5 , the value of the solution to the generalized knapsack without
bids from agent
W . We begin with the simple scheme.
4.1 A Simple Approximation Scheme
Let mKnapsack
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sidered as the midrange element. We implement the scaled dynamic programming
algorithm for mKnapsack
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￿ , and the
20second table the backward table, and denote it
￿
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Fig. 3. Computing VCG payments.
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￿
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Lemma 5 Suppose
Ł
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is anoptimalsolutionofthe generalizedknapsack problem
without bids from agent
W , and suppose that element
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in the optimal solution. Then, the expression in Eq. 7, for the restricted problem
gKnapsack
s
j
.
˝
￿
k
￿
￿
5 , computes a
.
e
/
ˆ
1
?
5 -approximation to
Ł
s
j
.
PROOF. From earlier, we deﬁne
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This completes the proof.
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A naive implementation of this scheme will be inefﬁcient because it might check
.
=
-
￿
L
>
@
?
5
’
pairs of elements, for any particular choice of
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W . In the next section, we present an efﬁcient way to compute Eq. 7, and
eventually to compute the VCG payments.
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244.3 Collecting the Pieces
Putting this altogether, the algorithm for to implement the VCG mechanism in our
procurement setting works as follows. First, using the 2 approximation algorithm,
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s
j
.
˝
￿
k
￿
￿
5 . The
time complexity of computing gKnapsack
s
j
.
t
￿
k
￿
x
5 by creating a new dynamic pro-
gramming table will be
:
I
.
￿
y
C
5 but by using the forward and backward tables, the
complexity is reduced to
:
I
.
￿
C
N
￿
O
$
P
￿
C
5 . We can further improve the time complexity
of our algorithm by computing Eq. 7 more efﬁciently. Currently, the algorithm uses
heap, which has logarithmic update time. In worst case, we can have two heap up-
date operations for each element, which makes the time complexity super linear. If
we can compute Eq. 7 in linear time then the complexity of computing the VCG
payment will be same as the complexity of solving a single generalized knapsack
problem.
255 Conclusions
We have presented a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for the single-
good multi-unit auction problem, using a marginal-decreasing piecewise-constant
biddinglanguage with quantity-basedside constraints. Our scheme is both approxi-
mately efﬁcient and approximately strategyproof within any speciﬁed factor
?
)
￿
* .
As such it is an exampleof computationallytractable
? -dominance result, as well as
an example of a non-trivial but approximable allocation problem. It is particularly
interesting that we are able to compute the payments to
- agents in a VCG-based
mechanism in worst-case time
:
I
.
˝
7
H
N
￿
O
$
P
￿
-
￿
5 , where
7 is the time complexity to com-
pute the solution to a single allocation problem.
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